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Security and trust
Required defenses for cross-boundary questions and answers.
Threat model
AQP objects cross system boundaries and may request information, clarification, approval, preference, or corrective action. Implementations must assume malicious queries, coerced respondents, poisoned answers, forged provenance, replay, SSRF, prompt injection, and sensitive-data leakage.
Consent and local authority
A consent mode expresses the requester's desired behavior; it is not authorization. Respondents and hosts MUST enforce their own user, organization, legal, and product policies. Silence, timeout, or unrelated tool approval MUST NOT be treated as consent to answer.
Data minimization
Responses SHOULD answer only the declared prompt without exposing unrelated prompts, transcripts, credentials, personal data, secrets, or raw tool payloads. Collectors SHOULD enforce strict schemas and length limits. Evidence should be represented as authorized references, not copied content.
Response safety
Collectors must preserve respondent kind, source, confidence, query, and subject lineage. A response such as an approval or preference may trigger side effects, so downstream systems must verify that its scope and authority match the intended action. Answers entering memory, ranking, or training pipelines require poisoning defenses and reversible rollout.
Transport security
Bindings inherit the security requirements of their underlying transport. Implementations must validate schemas before processing, sanitize display text, validate file or URL references, enforce authentication and authorization, and avoid logging capabilities.